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ANTI-TRUST: COURT OF APPEALS APPLIES BROWN SHOE
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
TO PROHIBIT VERTICAL MERGER
SINCE the passage of the Sherman Act' in 1890 Congress has re-
peatedly expressed its faith in a competitive free enterprise economy
through its statutory prohibitions of various activities presumed
detrimental to competition.2 The 1950 amendment to section 7 of
the Clayton Act 3 sought to provide additional protection to competi-
tion by including in its prohibitions the acquisition of the assets
of one corporation by another, where the effect of such acquisition
may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce in any section of the country. In the recent
case of Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC4 a vertical merger of a large
affluent corporation into a market composed of substantially smaller
enterprises was held to produce sufficient probability of anti-
competitive effects in the acquired customer's line of commerce to
constitute a violation of the amended section 7.5
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
2 E.g., Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958); Federal
Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958); Robinson-
Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 US.C. § 13 (1958).
$ 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be [to] sub-
stantially to lessen competition [between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
community), or to tend to create a monopoly [of any line of commerce]." (Material
in italics was added by the amendments; material in brackets was deleted.) In addition
to the elimination of the acquiring-acquired test and the additional prohibition of
asset acquisitions, other paragraphs of § 7 were also amended in details not here relevant.
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962) for the Supreme
Court's extensive discussion and interpretation of amended § 7.
'309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
B Section 7 had previously been held applicable to vertical mergers, but such cases
based a finding of a violatibn, at least in part, on the vertical anti-competitive effects
between the acquired and the acquiring corporations; whereas the court in the
.Reynolds case refused to rest its decision on the vertical effects of the merger between
the acquired and the acquiring corporations and based its decision entirely on the
horizontal effects in the acquired customer's line of commerce. See, e.g., Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334-46 (1962).
For a discussion of the distinctions between vertical, horizontal and conglomerate
mergers see H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 11-14 (1949).
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On August 1, 1956, Reynolds Metals Company purchased all
the stock and assets of one of its customers, Arrow Brands, Inc.
Prior to this acquisition Arrow had been engaged in the business
of converting and decorating raw aluminum foil, which it purchased
from various aluminum manufacturers including Reynolds, for
sale to the florist industry throughout the nation. At the time of
purchase Arrow's sales accounted for approximately one-third of
the total annual sales of floral foil, and approximately five per cent
of the total annual sales of all decorative foil. The FTC found
that this merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act,6 and ordered
Reynolds to divest itself of certain property acquired as a result of
the purchase. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the FTC's findings and order.7
This decision, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's recent
analysis of the amended section 7 in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States," raises several important questions in the application of the
provisions of the Clayton Act. The court's determination of the
relevant line of commerce, and its evaluation of the effects of the
merger in this line of commerce are the most notable aspects of the
decision.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a "product
market," a term which is often used synonymously with "line of
commerce" by the courts,9 must be delineated before a violation
of the Clayton Act can be found.10 Prior to the Brown Shoe decision
the courts devised various tests in an attempt to simplify the identi-
'Reynolds Metals Co., TRADE REG. REt'. (Complaints, Orders and Stipulations)
28533, motion to reopen proceeding denied, TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders
and Stipulations) 28666 (1960).
' The court excepted from the Commission's divestiture decree a building erected
after the merger in which Arrow was housed on the basis that such property was not
acquired as a result of the merger, and held that divestiture was unnecessary to restore
the competitive situation to its status before the merger. 309 F.2d at 230-31.
' 370 U.S. 294 (1962); 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 504, The Supreme Court, 1961
Term, 76 HAiv. L. REv. 54, 183 (1962). See Comment, 4 B.C. INn. & CoNf. L. REv. 159
(1962).
9E.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); and United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
0o,"Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a
violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which
will substantially lessen competition 'within the area of effective competition.' Sub-
stantiality can be determined only in terms of the market affected." United States v.
E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
fication of the "product market."" These tests apparently pro-
ceeded on the basis that a product market could be delineated by a
comparison of the competitive characteristics of the defendant's
products with like characteristics of various other products. 12  The
courts announced that "interchangeability of use" or "cross-elasticity
of demand" existed among various products when a substantial
similarity was found in their competitive characteristics, and con-
cluded that those products which were interchangeable or cross-
elastic constituted a product market, or line of commerce. 13 Thus,
it appears that the terms "interchangeability of use" and "cross-
elasticity of demand" were applied to various products only after
the courts had found, from an analysis of many economic and com-
petitive factors, that effective competition among those products
actually existed.14
In the Reynolds case the court recognized that the physical
characteristics of floral foil and other types of decorative foil were
not sufficiently different to provide a basis for distinguishing be-
"'See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957)
(peculiar characteristics); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 US.
377 (1956) (cross-elasticity of demand); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958) (price sensitivity and price differential); United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (reasonable inter-
changeability); United States v. Maryland and Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp.
799 (D.D.C. 1958) (objective of the merger), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
"In distinguishing between line of commerce and section of the country as used
in the amendment to § 7 the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that line of com-
merce is intended to mean the line of business in which the defendant is engaged.
The Committee used the terms "line of commerce," "relevant market" and "orbit of
competition" as possessing the same connotations, and concluded that a line of com-
merce is to be determined from an evaluation of the defendant's products-what he
produces and sells-in its competitive capacities, only one of which is the area in which
it is sold. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1950).
13 See, e.g., cases cited note 11 supra.
"The comment of Mr. Justice Reed in United States v. El. du Pont de Nemours
&" Co. is typical of the broad meaning previously applied by the courts to the terms
interchangeability and cross-elasticity: "If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane
causes a considerable number of customers of other flexible wrappings to switch to
cellophane, it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists
between them; that the products compete in the same market. .... The 'market' which
one must study to determine when a producer has monopoly power will vary with
the part of commerce under consideration. The tests are constant. That market
is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for
which they are produced-price, use and qualities considered." 351 U.S. 377 at 400,
404 (1956). (Emphasis added.) However, the tests of "interchangeability" and
"cross-elasticity" have been criticized. See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC,
296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Comment, 47 VA. L. REv. 1014
(1961).
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tween them. 15 Noting, however, that a comparison of physical char-
acteristics alone did not determine a "line of commerce" sufficiently
to permit Congress' mandate in the Clayton Act to be effectively
carried out, the court proceeded to apply a "submarket" test to the
products within this broad market of physically similar goods,10
and concluded that the florist foil "submarket" was the relevant line
of commerce rather than the broader market of decorative foil.17
The terms "interchangeability" and "cross-elasticity" were used by
the court to express its concept of the outer limits of this broad
market, and by using these terms in the exclusive sense of physical
characteristics of the goods, the court rejected a consideration of
other characteristics which, prior to the Brown Shoe case,18 have been
included in determining "interchangeability" and "cross-elasticity."10
Therefore; it appears that the court in the Reynolds case intended
the term "submarket" to include those products which, having
already been separated by their physical characteristics and labelled
interchangeable or cross-elastic, had similar competitive character-
istics other than physical.20 The conclusion that physical char-
acteristics were applicable only in determining the broad general
market is substantiated by the fact that the court based its decision
that floral foil constituted the relevant submarket entirely on the
competitive characteristics of (1) public and industrial recognition of
15 All decorative foil, including florist foil, was gauged at approximately .00065 inches
thickness, and the variations and tolerances allowed as to weight apparently provided
substantial leeway for overlapping of all types of decorative foil. 309 F.2d at 227.
26 Id. at 226-27.
171d. at 229.
28 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, indicated that competitive
characteristics of the goods under consideration, such as industry or public.recognition
of a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors, were valid criteria only in determining the boundaries of a
submarket. Thus, by implication, these factors were irrelevant in delineating the
"outer boundaries of a product market," which he stated were to be determined "by
the reasonable interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand" between the
defendant's product and substitutes for it. 370 U.S. at 325.
'1 See note 14 supra.
20 The court indicated that practical indicia of economic realities were not to be
used in determining the "outer limits" of the broad market which contains such
submarkets, and concluded that the development and qualification of the concept in
Brown Shoe now made it "clear that mere potential interchangeability or cross-
elasticity may be insufficient to mark the legally pertinent limits of a 'relevant line of
commerce.' The 'outer limits' of a general market may be thus determined, but
sharply distinct submarkets can exist within these outer limits which may henceforth
be the focal point of administrative and judicial inquiry under Section 7." 309 F.2d at
226.
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florist foil as a separate economic entity, (2) distinct customers and
(3) distinct prices. 2' Although the court was here primarily
concerned with subdividing the product market below the level of
physical identity, its limiting the broad market to physically similar
goods fails to provide a basis for analyzing the competitive effects
of a merger in a market composed of goods which have dissimilar
physical characteristics, but which are recognized and regarded by
the industry and the public gs constituting a distinct, but unified,
economic entity, and, therefore, actually in competition.
The Act .itself seems to provide the best criteria for determining
what products must be considered as constituting a relevant line of
commerce. As the proscribed conduct is the creation of a tendency
to lessen competition or create a monopoly,22 a merger is to be viewed
in the light of its probable effect on existing or potential compe-
tition.23 In order to determine whether or not a merger is within
the proscribed area, the line of commerce in which the effect of
the merger is to be evaluated should be sufficiently broad to include
all products which substantially compete with the defendant's
,product.2 4 It is noted, however, that the Brown Shoe case recog-
nized that a product may compete in several different ways, and
consequently, has provided authority for the courts to define the
defendant's product as existing in a multiplicity of markets rather
than in a single market.2 5 Thus, Arrow's product, floral foil, should
21 Id. at 227. Thus physical characteristics seem to be the basis on which the
court rested its decision that decorative foil of all kinds constituted the broad market
or the "outer boundaries" of the general market, and to this the court applied the
terms "interchangeability" and "cross-elasticity." Then, within this broad general
market as delineated by physical characteristics the court found relevant submarkets
from an evaluation of the other competitive characteristics. Id. at 227-29.
22 See note 29 infra.
2 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
2" "But the boundaries of the relevant market must be drawn with sufficient breadth
to include the competing products of each of the merging companies and to recognize
competition where, in fact, competition exists." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. at 326. (Emphasis added.) See also note 12 supra.
" "The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the [defendant's]
product itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well-defined
submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes.... Because § 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may sub-
stantially lessen competition 'in any line of commerce,' it is necessary to examine the
effects of a merger in each such economically significant submarket to determine if there
is a reasonable probability that the merger will substantially lessen competition. If
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be considered as existing in several lines of commerce such as
aluminum goods in general, decorative foils and wrapping and
packaging materials in addition to the floral foil market. Contrary
to the approach in the Reynolds case, the effect of the merger in
each of these lines of commerce may be evaluated for anti-competi-
tive effects under the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 7
in the Brown Shoe case, and the existence of the proscribed effects in
any of them should constitute a violation of the Clayton Act. 0G
A second important aspect of the decision in the instant case is
the finding of a violation of section 7 in the delineated line of com-
merce on the basis that the merger of Reynolds and Arrow created
a "capacity or potentiality to lessen competition." 27 Assuming the
court intended these terms to mean a mere possibility, rather than
a probability, of producing the proscribed effects, the decision is a
significant departure from prior opinions which have construed the
Act,2 8 and appears to be in conflict with the intent of Congress.
2
Manifestly the Act does not purport, and was not intended, to pro-
hibit all mergers, but only those which create a reasonable proba-
such a probability is found to exist, the merger is proscribed." 370 U.S. at 325. (Em-
phasis in original.)20 Ibid.
_27'The Commission is not required to establish that the Reynolds' acquisition of
Arrow did in fact have anti-competitive consequences. It is sufficient if the Com-
mission shows the acquisition had the capacity or potentiality to lessen competition.
That such a potential emerged from the combination of Reynolds and Arrow
was enough to bring it within Section 7.... The necessary probability of anti-
competitive effect has thus been shown." 309 F.2d at 230. (Emphasis added.)
28See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (reasonable
probability); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours 8- Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957)
(reasonable likelihood); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 518 (1st Cir. 1928),
reid on other grounds, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) (probable result); United States v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 865 U.S. 567
(1961) (reasonable probability); Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953) (probable
effect). For a general discussion of the applicable tests see Address by Attorney Gen-
eral Brownell, The Antitrust Aspects of Mergers, Meeting of the New York Chapter
of the Public Relations Society of America, September 80, 1954, 1 TRADE REG. RzP.
4310.16 (1961).
2 Congress has clearly indicated that its intent in inserting the words "may be"
in the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act was to establish a reasonable probability
test of effect in evaluating mergers under § 7. "The words 'may be' have been in
Section 7 of the Clayton Act since 1914. The concept of reasonable probability
conveyed by these words is a necessary element in any statute which seeks to arrest
restraints of trade in their incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged
restraints violative of the Sherman Act. A requirement of certainty and actuality of
injury to competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act
by reaching incipient restraints." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950). See
also 96 CONG. Rc. 16453, 16502 (1950); 51 CoNG. Rc. 14464 (1914).
bility of substantially lessening competition or tending to create
a monopoly.30 A merger, therefore, which threatens to lessen
competition in an insignificant or trivial manner, or which creates
a possibility, but not a likelihood of lessening competition is not
prohibited.3' On the other hand, there is no requirement that the
merger actually produce a lessening of competition in order to
violate the Act.32  Therefore, in order to determine whether an
acquisition falls within the .proscribed category, the courts have
found it necessary to forecast future consequences of the merger,3
and in so doing have consistently applied the "reasonable prob-
ability" test as determinative of future consequences.3 4
In the Reynolds case the court concluded that the vertical
effect of excluding other manufacturers of raw foil from selling to
the one third of the florist foil converting industry represented by
Arrow prior to Reynolds' acquisition was insufficient to create a
violation of the Act.35 Therefore, the violation had to occur, if at
all, as a result of the horizontal anti-competitive effects created in the
florist foil market by Reynolds' entrance as a competing supplier.
The only immediate and direct effect which this merger produced
was to insert Reynolds into the florist foil market as a replacement
for Arrow. Such a substitution of one corporation for another, in
the absence of other controlling factors, such as the market structure
or history of the industry, would not in itself create the proscribed
80 The language of § 7 that a merger is proscribed if "the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly" seems to
indicate that § 7 is restricted to those mergers where a probable lessening of competi-
tion will occur. (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court has stated: "Mere acquisition
by one corporation of the stock of a competitor, even though it result in some lessening
of competition, is not forbidden; the act deals only with such acquisitions as probably
will result in lessening competition to a substantial degree ... that is to say, to such
a degree as will injuriously affect the public." International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280
U.S. 291, 298 (1930). (Emphasis added.)
81 E.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp.
153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
aJJ'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
"2See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949). See also authorities cited
notes 27 and 28 supra.
Is "The test as to whether the merger produced a 'reasonable probability' that it
would lessen competition or tend toward monopoly is not an easy one to apply
because it obviously involves in a degree the forecasting of the future." Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
937 (1962).
81 See authorities cited note 27 supra.
8" 309 F.2d at 229.
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anti-competitive effects, but would maintain a status quo in the
market.
The court, nevertheless, reasoning that the injection of a large
affluent corporation into a market composed of less affluent enter-
prises produced the proscribed anti-competitive effects, concluded
that Reynolds' acquisition of Arrow constituted a violation of the
Clayton Act. This decision could have been justified on the previ-
ously accepted and well-established test of "reasonable probability"
by recognizing the substantial support which the proof of actual
anti-competitive effects gives to a finding that the reasonable prob-
ability of the merger was to create the proscribed effects. 6 The
court, however, stated that there was a violation if the acquisition
had the "capacity or potentiality" to lessen competition.87 This
rationale seems to stand for the proposition that, in the absence of
economic and social circumstances indicating a desirability for such
an acquisition, 8 the entrance into a market by way of a merger of
a corporation with sufficient assets to substantially lessen competition
by cutting prices will either create a lessening of competition in itself
in violation of section 7, or create a reasonable probability that such
power will be used to lessen competition. Both of these propositions
have the same legal effect since the creation of a reasonable prob-
" Proof of actual anti-competitive effects was available and was recognized by the
court; however, such proof was regarded as unnecessary to find a violation of the Act
as a showing of a capacity or potentiality to lessen competition was regarded by the
court as sufficient. Id. at 230.
It seems clear that a court is not required to find an intent to lessen competition or
an intent to achieve monopoly power or that competition has in fact been lessened in
order to find a violation of § 7, but a finding of the existence of any of these factors
seems to provide important considerations in forecasting the effects of the merger, and
in some instances may be conclusive of a violation. See Aluminum Co. of America v.
FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923); Continental Sec. Co.
v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927).
'7 309 F.2d at 230.
$Economic situations may arise in which mergers similar to the one in the
Reynolds case will be necessary to preserve competition, such as the introduction of
a large and healthy corporation into a market to preserve a competitive status quo
in place of a smaller failing corporation or where the market is already dominated
by large affluent companies and only another corporation of similar size and affluence
can effectively "hold its own" in the existing competition. The same may be said of
situations where the introduction of a large corporation is essential to meet existing
consumer demand. In such situations a vertical merger poses no threat to competition
and, consequently, would not violate the Clayton Act, but would tend to achieve the
same objective of protecting competition. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 328-34 (1962).
ability to substantially lessen competition will in itself constitute
a violation of the Clayton Act.3 9
While the end result of the Reynolds case appears to be con-
sonant with the purposes of the Clayton Act, several aspects of the
case are worthy of note. First, it appears that economic realities and
business practices were openly accepted by the court of appeals as
valid criteria for delineating relevant lines of commerce. 0 Second,
the court, while attempting to follow the Brown Shoe case, ap-
parently overlooked a significant aspect of that decision by un-
necessarily attempting to exclude the decorative foil market as a
relevant line of commerce in order to isolate the floral foil market
as the relevant line of commerce. If economic realities revealed
that both markets were lines of commerce in which Reynolds was
engaged, then, under the multiple market doctrine of the Brown
Shoe case, both markets were relevant, and a finding of the pro-
scribed effects in either of them should have been sufficient to find
a violation of section 7.41 Third, the multiple market concept
facilitates the finding of a violation of section 7 by eliminating the
necessity of excluding all but one line of commerce, but collaterally
increases the necessity of a "reasonable probability" test of effect in
order to avoid prohibiting mergers that were not intended by Con-
gress to be proscribed. The test apparently applied by the court in
the Reynolds case that a finding of a possibility, capacity or potenti-
ality to create the proscribed effects is sufficient to establish a viola-
tion of the Clayton Act is misleading as a precedent and is likely to
lead to unwarranted and undesirable results if followed. Unless
clarified to insure adherence to the reasonable probability test, this
decision may create a substantial restraint to diversification by verti-
cal or conglomerate mergers of large corporations into fields not
already inhabited by competitors of similar size and affluence.
11 The net effect of this rationale approaches the mechanical per se type rule
applied to some cases under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Such mechanical tests, however,
have been rejected as not applicable to § 7 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F-2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Trans-
america Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
901 (1953).
0 The court considered only four factors in determining floral foil to be a relevant
line of commerce: (1) physical characteristics, (2) existence as a separate economic
entity, (3) customers and (4) prices. 309 F.2d at 227-29.
41370 U.S. at 325.
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